

SUMMARY SHEET

National Rail System Standards Register of NRS Standards and Amendments

Date	New Bulletin #	Cancels Bulletin #	Reason / Change / (instruction No.)
25 Jul 22	552	442	NRSS 11 Heritage Vehicle and Train Management: <i>The standard NRSS 11, has been superceded by the Access Provider Interoperability Standard 11 (APIS 11)</i>
21 Jun 17	442	189	NRSS 8 Guidelines for Document Control: Update current version of NRSS 8, now Issue 4.1 – Document updated to cater more effectively for modern electronic systems
27 Mar 17	189	786	NRSS 5 Occurrence Management: Add Independent Fire Expert to Assignment of Investigators (5.1.1)
04 Nov 16	786	653	NRSS 5 Occurrence Management: Add MO / TPV / Trespassing – Person on Vehicle
15 Sep 16	653	791	NRSS 5 Occurrence Management: Add OR / GPS / E-Protect CSP Worksite
31 Oct 15	791	744	NRSS 3 Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers: a Delete NRSS 3 and replace with National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers.

Zero Harm, Auckland

Cancellation

Semi-Permanent Bulletin No. **442** dated *21 June, 2017* re National Rail System Standards is **cancelled**.

National Rail System Standards Register of NRS Standards and Amendments

Note: Where a paragraph is marked with a vertical line and the print is italic this indicates either it is a new instruction or if it was a previous change, a further change has been made.

Commencing **forthwith** and continuing until further advised the following instructions will apply:

Register of Current NRS Standards			
Standard	Description	Current Issue Number	Effective Date
NRSS 1	Definitions	Three	20 November 2011
NRSS 2	Safety Management	Three	20 November 2011
NRSS 3	Reserved for future use	-	-
NRSS 4	Risk Management	Two	11 June 2007
NRSS 5	Occurrence Management	Four	26 April 2012
NRSS 6	Engineering Interoperability	<i>Four</i>	19 April 2013
NRSS 7	Rail Operations Operability	Two	11 June 2007
NRSS 8	Guidelines for Document Control	4.1	27 March 2017
NRSS 9	Audit	Three	20 November 2011
NRSS 10	Crisis Management	Four	26 April 2012
<i>APIS 11</i>	Heritage Vehicle and Train Management	<i>Two</i>	<i>19 July, 2022</i>

NRSS/ 1 Definitions

Rail Personnel: (amended definition)

means employees, agents, contractors or volunteers engaged for the purpose of carrying out rail activities.

Rail Safety Regulator: (new definition)

The Crown entity responsible for administering New Zealand's rail safety legislation, licencing organisations that control and use rail networks and monitoring accidents and incidents.

NRSS/ 2 Safety Management

Replace “**NZ Transport Agency**” with “**Rail Safety Regulator**”

Section.5 (c) NRSS/ 3 – Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers

This standard will be withdrawn on 31st October 2015 and replaced by ‘National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers’ (National Transport Commission, October 2012).

NRSS/ 5 Occurrence Management

1.6 Occurrence Categories

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MO	TPV	Trespassing - Person on Vehicle
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Page 13 – Table 2B insert

OR	STL	Train Stalling
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OR	NTCC	NTCC Outages
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OR	RVM	Rail Vehicle Mechanical Fault
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OR	GPS	E-Protect CSP Worksite
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5.1 Assignment of Investigator

5.1.1 Independent Fire Expert (new instruction)

- a. KiwiRail's incident triage process will include flagging of all tunnel fire incidents, and all fire incidents where a rail vehicle could operate in tunnels, in order to trigger the process of consideration of whether an independent fire expert is required.
- b. When triggered, the process of consideration will be:
 - i. Did the controls fail to work as designed to contain or extinguish the fire?
 - ii. Is the immediate cause of the fire unable to be determined?
 - iii. Was there potential for fire escalation or loss of life?
 - iv. Was the rail vehicle unable to exit the tunnel and / or did the fire have to be fought inside the tunnel?
- c. If the answer to one or more is "Yes", then further consideration must be given to engaging an independent fire expert as part of the investigation.
- d. The decision to engage an independent expert will be made by the appointed Lead Investigator, and must be documented with reasons as part of the incident file.

SPAD CLASSIFICATIONS (new instruction)

References to SPAD A, B, C and D in NRSS5 should be replaced with the appropriate new classifications as shown below:

CLASSIFICATION A1–4:

- the train interface / operation of the train.

Classification:	Description:
A	A1 When a SPAD has occurred, and according to available evidence, a stop aspect, indication or end of movement authority ¹ was displayed or given correctly and in sufficient time for the train ² to be stopped safely at it.
	A2 When a SPAD has occurred, and according to available evidence, the stop aspect, indication or end of movement authority concerned was not displayed or given correctly, but was preceded by the correct aspects or indications.
	A3 When a SPAD has occurred, and according to available evidence, verbal permission / or a hand signal pass a signal at danger was given by a hand-signaller or other authorised person without the authority of the signaller / train controller.
	A4 When a SPAD has occurred, and according to available evidence, a stop aspect, indication or end of movement authority was displayed or given correctly and in sufficient time for the train to be stopped safely at it, but the operator was unable to stop the train owing to circumstances beyond their control. (e.g. poor rail head adhesion, train braking equipment failure or malfunction etc).

¹ end of train movement authority includes in-cab, signalled, paper and / or computer based occupancy authority.

² for SPAD reporting, “Train” includes an “MTMV”.

CLASSIFICATION B1–4:

- the operating interface / signalling / network and network integrity.

Classification:	Description:
B	B1 When a SPAD has occurred because a stop aspect, indication or end of movement authority ¹ , (that previously showed a proceed indication), was displayed because of infrastructure failure (e.g. signalling or level crossing equipment failure or malfunction, track circuit bridged or interrupted).
	B2 When a SPAD has occurred because a stop aspect, indication or end of movement authority, (that previously showed a proceed indication), was displayed because it was returned to danger or displayed in error.
	B3 When a SPAD has occurred because a stop aspect, indication or end of movement authority was not displayed in sufficient time for the train ² to be stopped safely at the signal, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority as it had been returned to danger automatically or in an emergency in accordance with the Network Controllers Emergency Plans.
	B4 When a SPAD has occurred because vehicles without any traction unit attached, or a train which is unattended, has run away past a signal at danger, or without an in-cab movement authority.

¹ end of train movement authority includes in-cab, signalled, paper and / or computer based occupancy authority.

² for SPAD reporting, “Train” includes an “MTMV”.

NRSS/ 7 Rail Operations Operability

5.2 Speed Restrictions (clarification of instruction)

A Heritage Operator must be able to access speed restriction information either by arrangement with KiwiRail operating personnel supplying it or by other means i.e. Train Control faxing it to a heritage operator’s depot.

NRSS/ 11 Heritage Vehicle and Train Management

NRSS 11 has been superceded by:

Access Provider Interoperability Standard 11 (APIS 11)

Change heading to:

APIS - 11 Heritage Vehicle and Train Management

G.J Hutchins

Industry Standards Manager